sp-brand-kit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses multiple shell commands for file management and processing. Evidence includes
find assets/brand -type f -exec md5 -r {} \;for duplicate detection andsips -s format jpeg in.heic --out out.jpgfor image conversion inSKILL.md. Additionally, an inline Python verification script inreferences/manifest.mdexecutesfileandsipsviasubprocess.runto validate file integrity. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions suggest executing an external shell script for installation:
sh <sp-canvas skill dir>/scripts/install.sh. This pattern involves executing code from a path outside the immediate skill directory. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests to various external services to fetch brand data and images. It fetches configuration and screenshots from well-known services such as Apple's iTunes API and the Google Play Store, as well as arbitrary marketing and press URLs provided as input.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external, untrusted sources such as marketing websites and social media platforms, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
curlfetches data from the App Store, Google Play, and user-provided URLs inSKILL.mdandreferences/sources.md. - Boundary markers: None explicitly implemented for the content fetched from third-party sites.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
subprocess.run(via the verification script),sh(installation), andcurlfor network operations. - Sanitization: The skill performs file type and dimension checks but does not explicitly sanitize filenames or HTML content against injection before processing.
Audit Metadata