verify-language-switch

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the web application under test, creating a potential surface for indirect instructions to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Page content is observed using reticle_look (sessions and elements) and reticle_act_and_wait (scanning for console output and text strings in specific regions like h1 and nav).
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to use specific delimiters or protective boundary markers when reading and asserting on text found on the page.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can perform significant actions including form filling (reticle_act), page navigation (reticle_navigate), and shell command execution (npx) during initial setup.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external content is documented before the agent evaluates the predicates.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include the execution of a shell command to initialize the testing environment.
  • Evidence: RETICLE_INSTALL_SOURCE=npx_skill npx @reticlehq/server@latest init. This command is used to initialize the vendor's server environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and executes software from a public registry during initialization.
  • Evidence: The use of npx @reticlehq/server@latest fetches the latest version of the vendor-owned package from the npm registry. This is consistent with the skill's intended purpose as a testing utility for the Reticle framework.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 09:16 AM