verify-language-switch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the web application under test, creating a potential surface for indirect instructions to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Page content is observed using
reticle_look(sessions and elements) andreticle_act_and_wait(scanning for console output and text strings in specific regions likeh1andnav). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to use specific delimiters or protective boundary markers when reading and asserting on text found on the page.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform significant actions including form filling (
reticle_act), page navigation (reticle_navigate), and shell command execution (npx) during initial setup. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external content is documented before the agent evaluates the predicates.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include the execution of a shell command to initialize the testing environment.
- Evidence:
RETICLE_INSTALL_SOURCE=npx_skill npx @reticlehq/server@latest init. This command is used to initialize the vendor's server environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and executes software from a public registry during initialization.
- Evidence: The use of
npx @reticlehq/server@latestfetches the latest version of the vendor-owned package from the npm registry. This is consistent with the skill's intended purpose as a testing utility for the Reticle framework.
Audit Metadata