data-migration

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions direct the orchestrator to extract 'connection info' from user input and save it to a local file named _workspace/00_input.md. This practice leads to the exposure of sensitive credentials, such as database passwords and host details, in plain text within the agent's work environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, specifically database schemas and user-provided files like DDL or ERDs, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided connection details and uploaded files (DDL, ERD) processed during Phase 1 and Phase 2.
  • Boundary markers: The workspace files and ingested schema data lack delimiters or instructions to the agents to disregard or isolate embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The agent team can write to the local filesystem, generate and potentially suggest execution of Python ETL scripts and SQL queries, and perform complex inter-agent messaging.
  • Sanitization: The workflow does not include any steps to sanitize or validate the content of the technical documents or schema metadata before they are used to influence the team's output.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 08:42 AM