personal-branding
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process potentially untrusted data from multiple sources including user-provided existing resumes, portfolios, and Job Descriptions (JDs) fetched from the web.
- Ingestion points: Direct user input, existing materials copied to the
_workspace/directory, and external content retrieved viaWebSearchandWebFetchtools. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the agent when processing user-provided career materials.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses a team of five agents with the ability to write files to the local filesystem (
_workspace/), perform network operations via search/fetch tools, and communicate viaSendMessage. - Sanitization: While the skill includes guidelines for abstracting confidential details, it lacks specific sanitization or validation protocols to prevent malicious instructions hidden within processed resumes or JDs from influencing agent behavior.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow requires the agent to perform filesystem operations to manage project deliverables.
- Evidence: Phase 1 instructions mandate the creation of a
_workspace/directory in the project root and the saving of structured data to_workspace/00_input.md.
Audit Metadata