codex-image
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/codex_imagegen_batch.shand the instructions inSKILL.mdare vulnerable to shell command injection. User-supplied prompts are interpolated directly into a double-quoted string within a bash command (codex exec ... "... '$prompt' ..."). If a prompt contains shell metacharacters such as$(...)or`...`, they will be executed by the local shell before the command is passed to the Codex CLI. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input (image prompts) and interpolates them into executable commands.
- Ingestion points: The
promptvariable inscripts/codex_imagegen_batch.shand the<프롬프트>placeholder inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. Prompts are placed directly into bash command strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes
codex execvia the shell, which has access to the workspace and the network (via the Codex tool itself). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no escaping or validation of the prompt content before it is used in a shell command.
Audit Metadata