segments
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to ingest and process metadata, such as cube definitions, segment names, and descriptions, from the RevOS MCP server using the
api_readtool. This content originates from external organizational data sources and is processed to inform subsequent agent actions or displayed to the user. - Ingestion points: The agent retrieves semantic model metadata and existing segment configurations from the
cubesandsegmentsresources (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions defining the use of output delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within these metadata strings when they are processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for significant state changes, including
api_write(create/update) andapi_deleteoperations, which are driven by the agent's interpretation of the ingested data (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit directives for sanitizing or escaping retrieved strings before they are used in prompts or forwarded to other API operations.
Audit Metadata