freecad-ai

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently instructs the agent to execute python3 freecad-client.py using shell heredocs (<<'PY') to run Python snippets on the local system.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a client-server architecture (freecad-client.py and freecad-server.py) to execute Python code within the context of a live FreeCAD process. This allows for arbitrary Python execution, which typically includes access to powerful system libraries like os and subprocess.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core design of translating user modeling requests into executable Python scripts.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted user requests for 3D modeling and CAD operations enter the agent's context and are used to generate code.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore or escape potentially malicious instructions embedded within user modeling requests.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute arbitrary Python code within FreeCAD and invoke shell commands via the freecad-client.py script.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not provide any mechanisms for sanitizing, validating, or sandboxing the generated Python code before it is executed.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references official FreeCAD documentation and download URLs (e.g., freecad.org, github.io). These are recognized as legitimate domain-specific resources and do not pose a security risk.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 7, 2026, 03:42 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — freecad-ai