agent-reach
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use several non-standard CLI tools to interact with external platforms, including
agent-reach,opencli,bili,twitter, andrdt. The behavior and source of these tools are not verified within the skill context. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill features a mechanism to check for updates (
agent-reach check-update) and encourages the agent to prompt the user to execute update instructions from a remote URL (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/main/docs/update.md). It also refers the agent to a remote installation guide (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/main/docs/install.md), both of which represent potential paths for executing unverified remote code. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
curlto fetch content fromr.jina.ai(a web-to-markdown reader) and the V2EX API. It also references files hosted on GitHub for documentation and installation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of fetching and synthesizing data from untrusted sources like social media and arbitrary web pages.
- Ingestion points: Data fetched from 15 platforms (including Twitter, Reddit, XiaoHongShu) and web pages processed via Jina Reader.
- Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive command execution capabilities (shell commands), network access (
curl,gh), and local file system access (/tmp/,~/.agent-reach/). - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of external content is mentioned before the data is processed or synthesized.
Audit Metadata