agent-reach
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a substantial attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its primary function of ingesting and processing data from numerous external and attacker-controllable platforms. \n
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context from platforms such as Twitter, Reddit, GitHub, and the general web through commands like exa.web_search_exa, twitter search, and the Jina Reader service (SKILL.md). \n
- Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or specific safety prompts to distinguish between the skill's operational instructions and the potentially malicious data retrieved from the internet (SKILL.md). \n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell execution for tools like curl, gh, yt-dlp, and agent-reach, which could be targeted by instructions embedded in fetched content (SKILL.md). \n
- Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation of retrieved content is mentioned or implemented before the data is processed by the agent (SKILL.md). \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references well-known services and the author's repository for core functionality and documentation. \n
- Uses r.jina.ai, a well-known technology service, for converting web pages into markdown format. \n
- Fetches update and installation guides from the official repository at github.com/Panniantong/agent-reach. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on local CLI tools for environment verification and performing research tasks. \n
- Executes commands such as agent-reach doctor, agent-reach check-update, and various platform-specific binaries for data retrieval. \n
- Appropriately manages data by using /tmp/ for temporary output and ~/.agent-reach/ for persistent configuration storage.
Audit Metadata