dym-cti-expert-investigate-in-claude-code
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze external identifiers (domains, URLs, IPs) from potentially hostile sources. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious data could attempt to manipulate the agent's behavior during investigation.
- Ingestion points: External target strings and URLs provided to the
/cti,/cti-recall, and/cti-pivotcommands. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the analyzed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can orchestrate sub-agents via the
--deepflag, execute shell commands (T2 markers), utilize MCP tools (T1 markers), and write case information to the localintel_engine/cases/directory. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of sanitizing or validating external identifiers before they are incorporated into tool inputs or sub-agent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes the use of a registration script (
scripts/register.sh) to install tools. Additionally, it features a--yoloflag specifically intended to suppress user confirmation prompts, allowing the agent to execute actions autonomously without manual oversight. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill automates the installation of persistent commands by symlinking files from the skill's
commands/directory into the user's~/.claude/commands/directory, ensuring they remain available across sessions.
Audit Metadata