plan
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads from external specification files and injects their content directly into tasks for other agents, which is an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The workflow (Step W01) ingests content from SPEC files located at
llmwiki/wiki/sources/draft/DDMMYY-<tên>.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide clear delimiters or instructions to treat the ingested SPEC content as untrusted data; it explicitly requires verbatim (nguyên văn) injection into downstream tasks.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
orcatool fortask-createanddispatch --injectoperations, which can execute commands or provide instructions to other agents. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation performed on the SPEC content before it is injected into the task dispatcher.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interacts with the
orcaorchestration CLI to automate task management. - Evidence: The skill workflow and action steps (W05, W08) detail the execution of
orca orchestration task-createandorca dispatch --injectto manage agent tasks.
Audit Metadata