docs-site-macos
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONOBFUSCATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile implements a bootstrap mechanism that takes a base64-encoded string, decodes it, decompresses it using theDecompressionStreamAPI, and executes the resulting JavaScript string using(0, eval)(code). This occurs during the initialization of the Mermaid Diagram Engine. - [OBFUSCATION]: The functional logic for the diagram engine is stored in
vendor/beautiful-mermaid.min.js.gz.b64as an opaque binary blob. Storing executable code in a compressed and encoded format prevents standard security tools from inspecting the library for malicious behavior or vulnerabilities before it is executed in the user's browser context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute several shell-based tools including
python3for multiple local utility scripts (e.g.,fdk/tools/html_font.py),nodefor executing a visual audit script, andnpx serveto host the generated content on a local port (8765). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection. It ingests untrusted markdown and wiki files to generate complex HTML structures. The evidence chain is as follows:
- Ingestion points: Reads source content from markdown files and wiki entries (
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or sanitization steps are documented for the input text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-writing capabilities to
llmwiki/html/and shell execution capabilities viapython3andnode. - Sanitization: The logic includes a regex to strip
@importfrom generated SVG styles, but lacks comprehensive sanitization for instructions that might be embedded in the user-provided markdown content.
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