harness-tour
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to suggest a command to the user that downloads a shell script from a remote GitHub repository and pipes it directly into the bash interpreter. This 'curl | bash' pattern is a significant security risk as it bypasses local verification and package management audits.
- Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Rheinmir/setup/orca/harness/poc-vendor-neutral/bootstrap.sh | bashsuggested in the 'Pre-check' section ofSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes multiple shell commands to inspect project state, check for file existence, and read logs. While functional for a security tour, these represent a broad capability for local command execution.
- Evidence: Execution of
grep -q llmwiki-validate .claude/settings.json,test -f harness/poc-vendor-neutral/bin/llmwiki-validate.py, andcat .claude/audit/*.jsonlas described in the workflow. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes project audit logs (
.jsonl) that record previous tool interactions. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if an external entity can influence the content of these logs. - Ingestion points:
.claude/audit/*.jsonlreferenced in the 'Kết màn' (Conclusion) and workflow sections ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None present; the skill treats log content as a source of truth for the tour summary.
- Capability inventory: File writing/deletion (
llmwiki/,wiki/index.md) and shell command execution (grep,test,cat,python3). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the audit log content is mentioned before it is displayed or processed.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Rheinmir/setup/orca/harness/poc-vendor-neutral/bootstrap.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata