new-project-setup

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill downloads a pre-compiled binary from an external GitHub repository (github.com/rtk-ai/rtk) and extracts it directly into /usr/local/bin using curl and tar.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill modifies the agent's global configuration file (~/.claude/settings.json) by executing rtk init -g. This expands the tool's influence over the agent's core operational environment.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: By hooking into the agent's global settings, the skill ensures that its modifications persist across different sessions and may influence future agent interactions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from potentially untrusted project files to seed the wiki metadata.
  • Ingestion points: Reads content from README.md, package.json, and go.mod (referenced in W05 and Step 5).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used during interpolation.
  • Capability inventory: Includes shell command execution (curl, tar, rtk), filesystem writes, and modification of agent settings.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested content is described before it is used to generate wiki pages or project requirements.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes system-level commands including kernel checks (uname -r), directory manipulation (mkdir -p), and binary installation to restricted paths.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 14, 2026, 02:26 AM