new-project-setup
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill downloads a pre-compiled binary from an external GitHub repository (
github.com/rtk-ai/rtk) and extracts it directly into/usr/local/binusingcurlandtar. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill modifies the agent's global configuration file (
~/.claude/settings.json) by executingrtk init -g. This expands the tool's influence over the agent's core operational environment. - [PERSISTENCE]: By hooking into the agent's global settings, the skill ensures that its modifications persist across different sessions and may influence future agent interactions.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from potentially untrusted project files to seed the wiki metadata.
- Ingestion points: Reads content from
README.md,package.json, andgo.mod(referenced in W05 and Step 5). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used during interpolation.
- Capability inventory: Includes shell command execution (
curl,tar,rtk), filesystem writes, and modification of agent settings. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested content is described before it is used to generate wiki pages or project requirements.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes system-level commands including kernel checks (
uname -r), directory manipulation (mkdir -p), and binary installation to restricted paths.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata