launch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and summarize data from repository history, specifically merged PR descriptions and commit messages, to generate changelogs and marketing drafts (detailed in
references/shipped-changes.md). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if an attacker can influence PR metadata or commit logs with malicious instructions intended to manipulate the agent's output. - Ingestion points: Merged PR titles, descriptions, and commit logs accessed via
git logcommands. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to treat this specific external data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions within it.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes command execution (reading git logs) and file reading to gather data, and generates multiple forms of content (emails, social posts, blog drafts).
- Sanitization: A critical mitigation is present: the skill explicitly states that all drafts are staged for human review and that 'Nothing in this workflow publishes on its own.'
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions to execute shell commands such as
git logto extract repository information for the changelog generation process. These commands use static flags and do not interpolate user-controlled variables in a way that suggests command injection risks.
Audit Metadata