feishu-cli-storage

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from Feishu APIs, including document metadata, wiki node titles, and user comments.
  • Ingestion points: Data is pulled into the agent context via commands like feishu-cli drive search, feishu-cli drive inspect, and feishu-cli comment list across various workflow files.
  • Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters defined to isolate ingested external data from the agent's core instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has significant write capabilities, such as modifying document permissions (perm add), deleting files (file delete), and managing wiki spaces (wiki delete-space).
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization routines for external content before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute shell commands using the feishu-cli utility to interact with the Feishu platform. It also utilizes jq and python3 for data manipulation.
  • Evidence: The allowed-tools field in SKILL.md explicitly permits the use of Bash(feishu-cli:*), Bash(jq:*), and Bash(python3:*).
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides functionality to move data between the local environment and the Feishu cloud service, which is its primary purpose.
  • Evidence: Workflow documentation in references/workflows/drive/workflow.md details commands for upload, download, pull, and push. The documentation highlights security features like SSRF protection that validates download URLs to prevent access to internal or loopback IP addresses.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 31, 2026, 11:15 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — feishu-cli-storage