feishu-cli-storage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from Feishu APIs, including document metadata, wiki node titles, and user comments.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled into the agent context via commands like
feishu-cli drive search,feishu-cli drive inspect, andfeishu-cli comment listacross various workflow files. - Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters defined to isolate ingested external data from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has significant write capabilities, such as modifying document permissions (
perm add), deleting files (file delete), and managing wiki spaces (wiki delete-space). - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization routines for external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute shell commands using the
feishu-cliutility to interact with the Feishu platform. It also utilizesjqandpython3for data manipulation. - Evidence: The
allowed-toolsfield inSKILL.mdexplicitly permits the use ofBash(feishu-cli:*),Bash(jq:*), andBash(python3:*). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides functionality to move data between the local environment and the Feishu cloud service, which is its primary purpose.
- Evidence: Workflow documentation in
references/workflows/drive/workflow.mddetails commands forupload,download,pull, andpush. The documentation highlights security features like SSRF protection that validates download URLs to prevent access to internal or loopback IP addresses.
Audit Metadata