pydeseq2
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's documentation in
references/workflow_guide.mdprovides examples and instructions for using thepicklemodule to save and load analysis states (e.g.,pickle.load(f)). Because Python'spickledeserialization is inherently unsafe and can execute arbitrary code, this practice poses a significant risk if the agent or user loads a malicious or untrusted.pklfile. - Evidence in
references/workflow_guide.md:with open("counts.pkl", "rb") as f: counts_df = pickle.load(f)andwith open("dds_result.pkl", "rb") as f: adata = pickle.load(f). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the processing of external data provided by the user, such as RNA-seq count matrices and metadata in CSV, TSV, or H5AD formats. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions hidden in the data could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points:
pd.read_csv()andad.read_h5ad()are used to load external data inSKILL.md,scripts/run_deseq2_analysis.py, andreferences/workflow_guide.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific delimiters or instruction-ignore warnings implemented to isolate the data from the agent's command processing.
- Capability inventory: The skill has local file-write capabilities via
to_csvandsavefiginscripts/run_deseq2_analysis.py. - Sanitization: While
scripts/run_deseq2_analysis.pyincludes basic validation for numeric counts and index matching, it lacks sanitization to detect or neutralize natural language instructions embedded within the datasets.
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