ad-creative
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In the
references/generative-tools.mdfile, the skill provides instructions for the user or agent to clone a repository (https://github.com/jamiepine/voicebox.git) and run build commands (make setup && make dev). This involves downloading and executing arbitrary code from an untrusted source, presenting a supply chain risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill suggests using several shell-based workflows. This includes using
npxto download and execute NPM packages (create-video,remotion) and executing local Node.js scripts (node tools/clis/google-ads.js) to interact with ad platforms. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download of third-party tools and assets, specifically through
git clonefor the Voicebox repository andnpxfor Remotion utilities. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes example
curlcommands that send content (such as ad scripts and descriptions) to various third-party AI service providers (Google Gemini, ElevenLabs, Cartesia, Ideogram). While these are recognized services, this behavior constitutes sending potentially sensitive product data to external endpoints. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest external data, such as marketing context and performance metrics (CSV/API output), and interpolate it into prompts. There is a risk of indirect prompt injection as the skill does not define strict boundary markers or sanitization logic for these external inputs.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata