agy-cli-agent
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag when executing theagybinary. This flag is documented to bypass all permission prompts, which removes human-in-the-loop safety gates and allows the sub-agent to execute actions without explicit user consent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration pattern involves constructing shell commands by interpolating user-controlled instructions and file content directly into command arguments (e.g.,
agy ... -p "$(cat target.py) ..."). This direct shell substitution is highly vulnerable to command injection if the processed files or instructions contain malicious shell characters or escaped sequences. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8):
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through files like
target.pyand direct<INSTRUCTION>parameters inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no XML delimiters, escape sequences, or specific instructions provided to the sub-agent to distinguish between system instructions and untrusted data content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Read, andWritetools, and executes commands through theagybinary, providing a significant impact vector for any successful injection. - Sanitization: The skill lacks any visible sanitization, validation, or filtering of the external content before it is processed by the sub-agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata