agy-cli-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/run_agent.pyexecutes theagybinary usingsubprocess.Popento process agent tasks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
agycommand is invoked with the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag, which is designed to suppress the tool's internal security confirmations and permission prompts during execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection within
scripts/run_agent.py. The script assembles a final prompt by concatenating the contents of a persona file, an input source file, and a task instruction without sanitization or robust structural isolation. Malicious content within the ingested files could potentially override the intended sub-agent instructions. - Ingestion points: The
persona_fileandinput_filearguments inscripts/run_agent.py(referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Minimal text delimiters (
---SOURCE---,---INSTRUCTION---) are used but are easily bypassable by adversarial input. - Capability inventory: The system executes shell commands via
subprocess.Popenand performs file system operations. - Sanitization: No escaping, filtering, or validation of the ingested file content is performed before interpolation into the prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration script modifies the process environment by prepending
/opt/homebrew/binto thePATHvariable and performs directory creation (os.makedirs) based on the user-providedoutput_filepath.
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