codex-cli-agent
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a 'Health Check' section that explicitly instructs the agent to runecho $OPENAI_API_KEY. If executed, this command will print the plaintext API key into the agent's output stream, exposing sensitive credentials to the user, logs, or downstream processes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality relies on executing a local script
./scripts/run_agent.pyand acodexbinary via shell commands. These executions incorporate user-provided instructions. While the skill claims to pipe input via stdin to avoid process listing exposure, the underlying script (run_agent.py) is not provided, making its input sanitization and command safety unverifiable. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read local file contents and transmit them to external OpenAI-compatible endpoints. Although this is the stated purpose, it establishes a functional path for exfiltrating sensitive local data if the agent is directed to process unintended files.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill processes untrusted content from local files (e.g.,
target.py) specified asINPUT_FILE. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the sub-agent to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted
Bash,Read, andWritetools, and it routinely executes shell commands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external file content before it is processed by the model.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata