fix-plugin-paths
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill contains hardcoded absolute machine paths that expose the author's local file system structure.
- File
evals/.lock.hashescontains multiple absolute paths (e.g.,/Users/richardfremmerlid/Projects/agent-plugins-skills/...) as keys for file hashes. - Trace files in
evals/traces/(e.g.,iter_001_KEEP_score0.82.json) include author-specific absolute paths within diff snippets and context fields recorded during skill development. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Python scripts to perform audits and quality evaluations.
- The
Bashtool is used to executepython ./scripts/audit_plugin_paths.pyfor identifying path portability issues in the target scope. - The
Bashtool is used to runpython <APS_ROOT>/plugins/agent-agentic-os/skills/os-eval-runner/scripts/evaluate.pyto calculate quality scores for skill iterations in Mode C. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests and processes untrusted file content.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads content from user-specified markdown and Python files (e.g., via
ReadandEdittools or the auditor script). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the files being audited.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,Write, andEdittools, enabling command execution and file modification based on audited results. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic for the external content is implemented in the skill instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references a documentation file on the author's GitHub repository.
- Found in
references/fix-plugin-paths.prompt.md:https://github.com/richfrem/agent-plugins-skills/blob/main/INSTALL.md.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata