os-evolution-planner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted 'Evolution goal' inputs and incorporating them into instructions for subsequent agent tasks.
- Ingestion points: User-provided
Evolution goalandTargetinputs defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The templates for brainstorming (Phase 1) and delegation (Phase 3) do not utilize explicit boundary markers or delimiters to isolate user-supplied goals from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Read, andWritetools, and it delegates tasks to thecopilot-cli-agentwith instructions to write files directly to the filesystem. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, sanitization, or filtering of the user-provided goals before they are interpolated into the task plans.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands and local scripts to orchestrate its workflow and manage logging.
- Evidence: Execution of
run_agent.pyto invoke different model backends for brainstorming and dispatching tasks. - Evidence: Use of standard utilities such as
grep,wc, andtestto perform heartbeat checks and verify the integrity of dispatch outputs. - Evidence: Execution of
plugins/agent-agentic-os/scripts/experiment_log.pyto record evolution metadata.
Audit Metadata