os-evolution-planner
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using the
Bashtool that incorporate potentially unvalidated user input. Specifically, thegoal,target, andslugvariables are directly interpolated into command strings forgh copilot suggest,gemini, and internal scripts such asrun_agent.pyandexperiment_log.py. This creates a significant risk of command injection if a maliciously crafted goal or target name is provided. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes well-known external CLI services, specifically GitHub Copilot (
gh) and Google Gemini (gemini), to perform brainstorming tasks. These services involve network communication and the processing of remote model outputs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Target files (e.g.,
SKILL.md) are read via theReadtool in Phase 2. User-providedEvolution goalandTargetare also ingested as primary inputs. - Boundary markers: None identified; untrusted data is directly interpolated into prompts and shell commands without delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Read, andWritetools, and executes local Python scripts and external CLIs. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of external content or user input is present before interpolation into prompts or shell commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata