adr-management

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 24, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The create subcommand in scripts/adr_manager.py contains a path traversal vulnerability. The user-provided title argument is used to construct a filename without sanitizing directory traversal sequences like ../. This allow an attacker to write markdown files to arbitrary locations outside the intended ADRs/ directory.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes the content of existing ADR markdown files from the repository. If an attacker introduces a malicious file (e.g., via a Pull Request), its content is loaded into the agent's context during search or listing operations, which could lead to the agent following embedded malicious instructions.\n
  • Ingestion points: adr_manager.py (list, get, and search subcommands) reads and outputs the contents of files from the ADRs/ directory.\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore instructions found within the processed files.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file read and write capabilities within the local environment.\n
  • Sanitization: Absent. File content is printed directly to stdout and incorporated into the agent's active context without filtering or escaping.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 24, 2026, 08:27 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — adr-management