llm-api-benchmark
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/parse-claude-logs.pyaccesses and parses log files located in~/.claude/logs/. These logs contain full conversation histories, request/response metadata, and potentially sensitive debug information which are exposed to the tool for metric extraction. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]:
scripts/benchmark.pyand the orchestrator instructions inreferences/orchestrator-patterns.mdprogrammatically retrieve sensitive authentication credentials, such asANTHROPIC_API_KEY,OPENAI_API_KEY, andAWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, from environment variables to authorize benchmark requests. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator workflow patterns described in
references/orchestrator-patterns.mdinstruct the subagent to execute shell commands, includingdatefor high-precision timestamps andecho $ANTHROPIC_BASE_URLto verify configuration, which are used to coordinate the benchmarking sequence. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The benchmark tool initiates network connections to well-known AI service providers, including Anthropic (
api.anthropic.com), OpenAI (api.openai.com), and Google Gemini. These are recognized as trusted services, and the connections are consistent with the skill's stated purpose. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes task-specific prompts (e.g., in
references/task-prompts.md) and user-provided inputs without explicit boundary markers or sanitization. When processed by subagents with capabilities to write files and access networks, this creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection, although the risk is low due to the tool's specialized use case.
Audit Metadata