rc-codeprobe

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator instructions in SKILL.md include a pattern where user-provided input is interpolated directly into a shell command. Specifically, in Section 4 (Sub-Skill Execution), the agent is instructed to run python3 scripts/dependency_mapper.py <target_path> and scripts/file_stats.py via the Bash tool. There is no mention of sanitization or validation for the <target_path> argument, which could allow a malicious user to perform command injection (e.g., providing a path like "; rm -rf / ; ") that the agent would execute in the shell.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because its primary purpose is to ingest, read, and process untrusted source code from a user-specified directory. The ingested code is then passed as context to sub-agents for analysis.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads all source files (.ts, .py, .php, etc.) at the target path provided by the user (Section 4 of SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses delimiters (=== FILE: {filepath} === and === END FILE ===) to wrap file content, which provides some separation but does not fully prevent an adversary from crafting content that breaks out of the delimiters to influence the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestrator and its sub-agents have access to powerful tools including Bash (executing scripts), Write (saving reports), and Read (accessing the filesystem).
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the ingested source code content is described before it is interpolated into the agent's prompt context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 20, 2026, 04:57 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — rc-codeprobe