rc-codeprobe
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator instructions in
SKILL.mdinclude a pattern where user-provided input is interpolated directly into a shell command. Specifically, in Section 4 (Sub-Skill Execution), the agent is instructed to runpython3 scripts/dependency_mapper.py <target_path>andscripts/file_stats.pyvia the Bash tool. There is no mention of sanitization or validation for the<target_path>argument, which could allow a malicious user to perform command injection (e.g., providing a path like"; rm -rf / ; ") that the agent would execute in the shell. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because its primary purpose is to ingest, read, and process untrusted source code from a user-specified directory. The ingested code is then passed as context to sub-agents for analysis.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads all source files (
.ts,.py,.php, etc.) at the target path provided by the user (Section 4 ofSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill uses delimiters (
=== FILE: {filepath} ===and=== END FILE ===) to wrap file content, which provides some separation but does not fully prevent an adversary from crafting content that breaks out of the delimiters to influence the agent. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator and its sub-agents have access to powerful tools including
Bash(executing scripts),Write(saving reports), andRead(accessing the filesystem). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the ingested source code content is described before it is interpolated into the agent's prompt context.
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