twitter-hand-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and processes untrusted data from external sources to automate social media engagement, which introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The agent ingests external data by fetching mentions from the Twitter API (saved to
mentions.json) and researching trending topics using theweb_searchtool. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions in the system prompt to prevent the agent from being influenced by malicious commands embedded in the external content it reads.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful tools like
shell_exec,file_write, andschedule_create, which could be exploited if an injection attack successfully manipulates the agent's logic. - Sanitization: The instructions provide behavioral guidelines (e.g., 'never engage with trolls') but lack technical sanitization or validation logic for inputs received from external sources.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent uses
shell_execto interact with the Twitter API viacurland to check system information withpython. While these operations target a well-known service (Twitter) for their intended purpose, the dynamic construction of shell commands involving generated text or web data presents a potential risk of command injection if the agent fails to properly escape input characters (such as quotes) when building the command strings.
Audit Metadata