github-image-upload
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automatically installs the
gh-imageextension from an external third-party GitHub repository (drogers0/gh-image) if it is not already present. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By installing and then invoking the
gh imagecommand, the skill executes code downloaded from an external source at runtime. The execution of third-party extensions within the GitHub CLI environment can perform arbitrary operations. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill is designed to access and utilize the
user_sessioncookie from the local browser's cookie store (e.g., Chrome, Firefox, Keychain). As noted in the skill's own documentation, this cookie grants full account access and is treated as a highly sensitive credential. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by reading untrusted data from external sources and processing it within the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads the body of GitHub Pull Requests or Issues using the
gh pr vieworgh issue viewcommands and stores the content in a variable (BODY). - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands used when interpolating this untrusted data into subsequent commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands, install extensions, and modify GitHub repository content (PR/Issue edits and comments).
- Sanitization: While the skill uses
printfand--body-file -to prevent shell-level injection, it does not sanitize or filter the content for natural language instructions that might redirect the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata