omh-jev-failure-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to transmit local execution data (the failing command and error excerpts) to an external service named 'Jev' via the
omh_jev_asktool. The instructions include specific mitigations: requiring the agent to inform the user what data leaves the machine, obtaining explicit consent before the first transmission, and instructions to remove credential-like content from the payload rather than redacting it silently. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the local environment, specifically system error logs and command output, which are then processed and sent to an external analysis tool. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if an attacker-controlled file or process generates a malicious error message designed to influence the agent's triage behavior.
- Ingestion points: Error excerpts and command history are collected into the
stateobject withinSKILL.md(Procedure step 2) andreferences/full-contract.md(Required inputs). - Boundary markers: The data is encapsulated within a structured JSON
stateobject before being passed to the tool. - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
omh_jev_asktool to perform external analysis and subsequently hands off tobuild-failure-triageoragent-debugbased on the result. - Sanitization: The skill instructions in
references/full-contract.md(Recovery Notes) explicitly direct the agent to check for and remove 'credential_like_content' from thestateobject before transmission.
Audit Metadata