omh-long-document-reading
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's recovery procedures instruct the agent to use
pip installto fetch and install Python packages such aspdfplumber,pypdf,pymupdf,pypdfium2, andmarker-pdfif they are missing from the environment. These dependencies are not pinned to specific versions, which introduces a potential supply chain risk during runtime acquisition. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies heavily on the
terminaltool to execute Python scripts (pdf_read.py,pdf_split.py,pdf_page_image.py,extract_pymupdf.py,extract_marker.py) located in productivity skill directories. This provides a mechanism for system-level interaction triggered by document processing. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and summarize large, untrusted documents, which creates an attack surface for instructions embedded within the PDF content.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted PDF data enters the agent context through tools like
pdf_read.py,extract_pymupdf.py, and the platform's nativeread_filefunctionality as described inSKILL.mdandreferences/hermes-pdf-limits.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not include explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the processed text.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes high-impact capabilities including
terminalfor shell command execution,pipfor software installation, anddelegate_taskfor sub-agent management. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the extracted document content before it is processed by the agent or sub-agents.
Audit Metadata