ulw-maestro
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it composes agent instructions using data retrieved from local tool discovery. Specifically, it uses 'invocation strings' from installed skills verbatim in the final prompt sent to external agents.
- Ingestion points: Data returned by
omh coding executor-skills(referenced inreferences/executor-prompt-composition.md). - Boundary markers: Implements a 'Section Contract' (Goal, Do, Don't, etc.) and an 'Evidence boundary' to delimit sections.
- Capability inventory: Executes shell commands via
omh coding runandomh coding fanout dispatch, and provides instructions to agents (Claude Code, Codex) that possess file-write and command-execution capabilities. - Sanitization: None observed; the skill explicitly states to use invocation strings 'verbatim' and 'never a guessed prefix'.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically assembles a complex prompt ('handoff prompt') from external metadata and command outputs, which is then used to direct the execution of powerful coding agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs multiple subprocess calls to the
omhCLI suite and manages the execution of external coding CLIs such asclaude-codeandcodex. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Documentation within the skill suggests the use of the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag when dispatching work to external executors, which bypasses standard permission prompts in non-interactive environments.
Audit Metadata