google-ads
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions (in SKILL.md and references/api-setup.md) direct the agent to execute
cat ~/.google-ads.yaml. This file is the primary storage for Google Ads API credentials, including thedeveloper_token,client_id,client_secret, andrefresh_token. Reading this file directly into the agent's prompt context creates a high risk of credential exposure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses several shell commands to manage the environment and verify configurations:
ls ~/.google-ads.yamlandls google-ads.yamlare used to check for configuration files.python -c "from google.ads.googleads.client import GoogleAdsClient; print('OK')"is used to verify the SDK installation.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation (references/api-setup.md) instructs users and agents to install external dependencies using
pip install google-adsandpip install google-auth-oauthlib. These are well-known packages from a trusted service provider. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: The agent retrieves data from the Google Ads API (search responses) and performs browser snapshots (
browser:snapshot) of live web pages at ads.google.com. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the workflows.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities for shell command execution (
python,ls,cat) and browser control, which could be abused if malicious instructions are encountered in the data. - Sanitization: There are no provided instructions for sanitizing, validating, or escaping the data fetched from the API or the browser before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata