landing-page-design

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to install the infsh CLI using curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This is a dangerous pattern that executes a remote script directly in the shell without providing a mechanism for the user to verify the script's contents or integrity before execution.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on several external AI models and search services hosted by providers such as fal.ai, Tavily, Exa, and ByteDance. These are accessed via the infsh command-line tool.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes npx to install additional skills from inference-sh/skills, which involves downloading and executing Node.js packages from a remote registry.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it accepts untrusted user input for search queries and image generation prompts without sufficient sanitization or boundary markers.\n
  • Ingestion points: User-provided text in infsh app run commands within SKILL.md.\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters to isolate user-provided data.\n
  • Capability inventory: Access to the Bash tool to run the infsh CLI, enabling network requests and external service interaction.\n
  • Sanitization: Absent. No input filtering or escaping is implemented before sending data to remote AI models.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 27, 2026, 12:15 PM