landing-page-design
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to install the
infshCLI usingcurl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This is a dangerous pattern that executes a remote script directly in the shell without providing a mechanism for the user to verify the script's contents or integrity before execution.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on several external AI models and search services hosted by providers such asfal.ai,Tavily,Exa, andByteDance. These are accessed via theinfshcommand-line tool.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizesnpxto install additional skills frominference-sh/skills, which involves downloading and executing Node.js packages from a remote registry.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it accepts untrusted user input for search queries and image generation prompts without sufficient sanitization or boundary markers.\n - Ingestion points: User-provided text in
infsh app runcommands withinSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters to isolate user-provided data.\n
- Capability inventory: Access to the
Bashtool to run theinfshCLI, enabling network requests and external service interaction.\n - Sanitization: Absent. No input filtering or escaping is implemented before sending data to remote AI models.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata