sync-provider
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to construct shell commands using variables extracted from local configuration files (
package.json) via shell pipelines. Specifically, the repository URL is extracted using grep, cut, and sed, then passed directly into a pnpm exec tsx command. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the repository URL field contains shell metacharacters like semicolons or backticks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the processing of untrusted data from external sources, leading to an indirect prompt injection risk.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read, analyze, and apply changes from git diff files stored in the .diffs/ directory, which are fetched from external GitHub repositories.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the authority to edit local source code, execute terminal commands (test and lint), and interact with the Pal MCP refactor tool.
- Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are provided to distinguish between legitimate code changes and potential malicious instructions embedded in the diff content.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks any mechanism to validate or sanitize the content of the diffs before the agent processes them or uses them to generate implementation plans.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automates the download of content from external GitHub repositories. While the documentation provides examples from a specific user, the underlying logic allows fetching data from any repository specified in a provider's package.json file.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata