workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates an indirect prompt injection surface through the
DurableAgentexample. - Ingestion points: The
userMessageparameter is ingested directly into the agent context inmyAgentWorkflow(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None; untrusted user input is passed directly to the
DurableAgent.streammethod without delimiters. - Capability inventory: Tools such as
lookupDatautilize the"use step"directive which, according to the documentation, grants 'full Node.js access'. The agent also has access tonpxCLI commands (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation performed on the
userMessagebefore processing. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill metadata identifies the author as 'Vercel Inc.', which conflicts with the assigned author context of 'rmsite'. This deceptive metadata can lead to misjudgment regarding the skill's origin and safety.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation instructs the user and agent to utilize various CLI tools via
npx workflowfor debugging and inspecting workflow runs, which involves executing code from the NPM registry.
Audit Metadata