code-review-ai-ai-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided Python orchestrator script and GitHub Actions YAML contain commands that execute system processes.
- The
CodeReviewOrchestratorclass inSKILL.mdusessubprocess.runto executesonar-scannerandsubprocess.check_outputforsemgrep. - The
sonar-scannercommand interpolates theself.repovariable:f'-Dsonar.projectKey={self.repo}'. If the repository name is not sanitized, this could lead to command injection. - The GitHub Actions example executes
sonar-scanner,codeql, andsemgrepdirectly in a shell environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to process untrusted code (the
diff) using LLMs, which is a known attack surface. - Ingestion points: The
$ARGUMENTSvariable and thediffstring passed to theai_reviewmethod inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The Python prompt uses string interpolation (
**Diff:** {diff}) but lacks explicit escaping or instruction-isolation delimiters to prevent the model from obeying instructions embedded within the code diff itself. - Capability inventory: The script has the capability to post review comments to the GitHub API and execute local shell commands via
subprocess. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for the code diff before it is sent to the LLM.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly references the use of sensitive API tokens.
- The Python script accesses
os.environ['GITHUB_TOKEN']andos.environ['ANTHROPIC_API_KEY']. - The GitHub Actions YAML references
${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}. - Note: This is documented as a standard practice for secret management (safe practice), but it highlights the skill's reliance on high-privilege credentials.
Audit Metadata