git-pr-workflows-pr-enhance

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python scripts in resources/implementation-playbook.md use subprocess.run to execute Git commands via string interpolation. Specifically, the _get_changed_files and _get_change_stats methods construct commands using f"git diff ... {base_branch}". If the base_branch variable is influenced by untrusted input, it could allow for Git argument injection (e.g., using flags like --ext-diff to execute arbitrary binaries), even though shell=True is not used.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data (git diffs and commit messages) which could be controlled by an attacker in a collaborative environment.
  • Ingestion points: Git diff output and commit history processed in PRAnalyzer.analyze_changes and generate_pr_description within resources/implementation-playbook.md.
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following directives found inside the diffs or commits.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via subprocess.run and generate content based on analyzed data.
  • Sanitization: No filtering or sanitization of the content extracted from Git is performed before it is presented to the agent for analysis.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 22, 2026, 05:19 PM