git-pr-workflows-pr-enhance
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python scripts in
resources/implementation-playbook.mdusesubprocess.runto execute Git commands via string interpolation. Specifically, the_get_changed_filesand_get_change_statsmethods construct commands usingf"git diff ... {base_branch}". If thebase_branchvariable is influenced by untrusted input, it could allow for Git argument injection (e.g., using flags like--ext-diffto execute arbitrary binaries), even thoughshell=Trueis not used. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data (git diffs and commit messages) which could be controlled by an attacker in a collaborative environment.
- Ingestion points: Git diff output and commit history processed in
PRAnalyzer.analyze_changesandgenerate_pr_descriptionwithinresources/implementation-playbook.md. - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following directives found inside the diffs or commits.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via
subprocess.runand generate content based on analyzed data. - Sanitization: No filtering or sanitization of the content extracted from Git is performed before it is presented to the agent for analysis.
Audit Metadata