linkerd-patterns

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a command template to download and execute the Linkerd installer via curl https://run.linkerd.io/install | sh. This is the official installation method for the Linkerd service mesh, an established cloud-native project.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Contains numerous templates involving shell commands for kubectl and the linkerd CLI to manage cluster resources, service profiles, and traffic routing.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface where the agent processes Kubernetes YAML templates and shell commands. If the agent is instructed to populate these templates or commands using untrusted data from external sources, it could potentially lead to the deployment of malicious configurations.
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied parameters for Kubernetes manifests (namespaces, labels, service names) and CLI arguments in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings are used to separate user-provided data from the static templates.
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution capabilities via kubectl and linkerd tools documented in SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or input validation logic is present in the skill instructions.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://run.linkerd.io/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 03:56 AM