tdd-orchestrator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external, untrusted data such as "requirements and user stories" and "code changes" to drive development workflows. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in these inputs could attempt to override the agent's logic or trigger unintended actions in connected tools.
  • Ingestion points: The agent processes "requirements and user stories" and "code changes" (referenced in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or delimiters to help the agent distinguish between its own core instructions and potentially malicious commands embedded in external requirements.
  • Capability inventory: The skill mentions integration with high-privilege environments, including build systems (Maven, Gradle, npm, Cargo, MSBuild), IDE plugins, and Continuous Integration (CI) pipelines.
  • Sanitization: There are no requirements for input validation, sanitization, or human-in-the-loop verification before the agent acts on processed requirements.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill promotes "Natural language to test code conversion and automation" and "AI-powered test data creation." This behavior involves generating executable code from non-executable descriptions. If the agent automatically saves and executes this generated code in a development or CI environment, it risks executing unintended logic if the generation process is manipulated by indirect injection or model hallucinations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 02:25 AM