await-ci
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection or command injection because it directly interpolates the
$ARGUMENTS(PR number) into shell commands without sanitization. - Ingestion points: The
$PR_NUMBERvariable is derived from user-supplied$ARGUMENTSinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions to treat the input as literal data rather than executable shell parameters.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands using the
ghCLI (e.g.,gh pr view $PR_NUMBER). - Sanitization: No input validation, escaping, or filtering is performed on the
$PR_NUMBERvariable before it is used in the command line. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
ghcommand-line tool to interact with GitHub. Whileghis a standard tool, the lack of input validation mentioned above allows for the execution of arbitrary commands if a malicious PR number (e.g.,97; rm -rf /) is provided.
Audit Metadata