claude-runner
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions and the
run_claude.pyscript explicitly enable the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag for the Claude CLI by default. This overrides the CLI's built-in safety boundaries and permission prompts, allowing the model to perform operations without user-facing confirmation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script executes external commands using
subprocess.run. Specifically, theresolve_claude_oauth_tokenfunction spawns an interactive login shell (e.g.,/bin/zsh -lic) to extract theCLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKENenvironment variable. This execution triggers the loading of shell configuration files which could contain arbitrary code. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and processes sensitive credentials from the environment, including
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN,ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, andANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN. While these are used for authenticating the CLI, the retrieval mechanism involves executing shell environment logic. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a fallback mechanism that dynamically executes other local scripts (e.g.,
codex-runner/scripts/run_codex.py) based on availability, which increases the execution surface of the agent.
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