cline-runner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data that is subsequently processed by the autonomous Cline CLI agent, creating an injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The
promptargument,--prompt-file,--session-file, and--output-schemainputs processed inscripts/run_cline.py. - Boundary markers: The
build_promptfunction inscripts/run_cline.pyuses text-based headers (e.g., 'Role:', 'Execution constraint:', 'Prior conversation context:') to separate instructions from data. - Capability inventory: The skill invokes the
clineCLI usingsubprocess.run. Theclineagent possesses broad capabilities including file system access and shell command execution. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content within the ingested prompt or source files before they are passed to the CLI agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill core functionality involves executing the local
clineCLI throughsubprocess.runcalls inscripts/run_cline.py. This is the intended behavior for this tool runner. - [PERSISTENCE]: As documented in
references/runtime-reference.mdand implemented inscripts/run_cline.py, the skill will mutate the user's global Cline configuration (~/.cline/data/settings/providers.json) when the--modelflag is used without an isolating--data-dir. This persists changes to the provider's default model across future interactive sessions.
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