codex-runner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
codexCLI and potentially other local runner scripts (as fallbacks) usingsubprocess.run. Evidence: - In
scripts/run_codex.py, the_run_codexandinvoke_fallbackfunctions construct command lists and pass them tosubprocess.run. - The script uses
shlex.quoteto escape arguments when generating command display strings, and passes arguments as a list tosubprocess.runto prevent shell injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data in the form of prompts and external files, which are then passed to the Codex CLI for execution.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
promptargument,--prompt-file, and--session-fileinputs inscripts/run_codex.py. - Boundary markers: The skill implements several isolation mechanisms, including
read-onlyandworkspace-writesandboxes, and arepo_read_onlytool profile that disables plugins, apps, and MCP servers. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via the Codex CLI and can write to the filesystem if the user explicitly authorizes it via flags like
--allow-writeor--full-auto. - Sanitization: CLI arguments are handled via list-based subprocess calls to avoid shell parsing. The skill also supports enforcing output structure via JSON schema validation (
--output-schema) to ensure model responses adhere to an expected format.
Audit Metadata