collaborative-delivery
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/panel_round.pyutilizessubprocess.runto execute local programs and scripts. The command paths and arguments are dynamically resolved from theassets/routing.tomlconfiguration file, which maps different roles to specific provider scripts (e.g.,.agents/skills/claude-runner/scripts/run_claude.py). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestration logic in
scripts/panel_round.pyis vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. It reads the contents of external files provided via the--context-fileargument and interpolates this data directly into the prompts for sub-agents with minimal boundary separation. - Ingestion points: Files read from the file system and passed as context to the
panel_round.pyscript via the--context-fileCLI argument. - Boundary markers: Uses simple Markdown headers (e.g.,
## Context file: {path}) and triple-dash separators, which are insufficient to reliably prevent models from following instructions embedded within the context data. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute subprocesses and write logs/artifacts to the
.codex_workflow/deliverydirectory. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping, filtering, or validation performed on the ingested file content before it is processed by the AI models.
Audit Metadata