dcode-runner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/run_dcode.pyusessubprocess.runto execute the localdcodeCLI tool and various fallback runner scripts (run_claude.py,run_codex.py,run_pi.py) to process user prompts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from the workspace and interpolates it into prompts for an agentic CLI tool.
- Ingestion points: The
build_promptfunction inscripts/run_dcode.pyreads content from file paths provided via the--prompt-fileand--session-filearguments. - Boundary markers: While the script adds descriptive headers to delineate injected content (e.g., 'Prior conversation context to continue from:'), the documentation in
references/runtime-reference.mdexplicitly warns that these are 'soft constraints' and that the read-only overlay is not a hard security boundary. - Capability inventory: The skill invokes the
dcodeCLI, which is an agentic tool capable of performing workspace modifications and file operations. - Sanitization: There is no sanitization, escaping, or schema validation performed on the content loaded from external files before it is injected into the prompt.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/run_dcode.pyscript dynamically modifiessys.pathto load sibling modules and utility scripts (runner_jobs,skill_paths) based on the detected skill layout. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
references/runtime-reference.mdsuggests installing thedcodeCLI prerequisite from a well-known service using the commandcurl -LsSf https://langch.in/dcode | bash.
Audit Metadata