muse-runner
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/run_muse.pyuses dynamic path manipulation to import code. It modifies the Python path viasys.path.insert(0, ...)using a calculated path (../../cline-runner/scripts) located two levels above its own directory. This allows the execution of modules from an external location not contained within the skill's package structure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is to invoke the
clineCLI tool to run prompts, which involves executing shell commands through a runner wrapper. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdfile instructs users to perform a global installation of theclinetool from a public package registry (npm install -g cline). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's security model explicitly notes that prompt text, metadata, and files read during execution are transmitted to external service providers (e.g., OpenRouter).
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an interface for processing external data and user prompts, creating a surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided prompts and prompt files referenced in
scripts/run_muse.py. - Boundary markers: None; the wrapper script does not implement delimiters or safety instructions to separate data from commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes the
clinetool, which has broad capabilities including file system access and network operations. - Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization logic is present in the wrapper script.
Audit Metadata