review-gate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface as it is designed to process untrusted external data, including pull request descriptions, linked issues, and code diffs.
- Ingestion points: Phase 0 in
SKILL.mdidentifies that PR metadata (viagh) and diffs (viagit) are the primary inputs for review. - Boundary markers: The skill contains robust mitigation instructions in
SKILL.mdand individual persona briefs (e.g.,security-tenancy-reviewer.md), explicitly directing the agent to treat instructions in reviewed content as untrusted and to report attempts to force approval as P0 defects. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bashfor shell execution and theAgenttool to orchestrate multiple sub-processes, providing a path for successful injections to reach execution environments. - Sanitization: While it uses structured data from the
ghCLI, it lacks explicit escaping for all variables interpolated into shell commands, though the usage patterns forgitandghare largely restricted. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on the
Bashtool to perform repository operations and execute verification pipelines. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains multiple shell execution blocks forgit diff,gh pr view, and directory management. It also instructs the agent to execute commands found in external files. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a dynamic discovery mechanism to execute commands defined in a local file if a dependent skill is missing.
- Evidence: Phase 2 in
SKILL.mddirects the agent to readverify-changes/references/command-discovery.mdand follow the commands defined therein directly, which represents a runtime dependency on external configuration content.
Audit Metadata