kicad-check
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
check.pyscript dynamically modifies the Python module search path usingsys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(HERE, '..', 'kicad-schematic'))to import alintfunction from a sibling folder. This constitutes dynamic loading from a computed path. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external commands via
subprocess.run(). It determines the path to thekicad-cliexecutable by checking theKICAD_CLIenvironment variable or looking in several hardcoded standard installation paths. This allows execution of a user-provided binary if the environment variable is manipulated. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted KiCad design files (.kicad_sch, .kicad_pcb). \n- Ingestion points: Reads project, schematic, and board files via
open().read()and via thekicad-clitool. \n- Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates or processing logic. \n- Capability inventory: File system read access, file copying viashutil.copy, and subprocess execution. \n- Sanitization: There is no sanitization or filtering of text content (such as comments or field values) within the design files before their contents are processed and summarized for the AI agent.
Audit Metadata