kicad-view
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external tools including
kicad-cli,pdftoppm, andpdfinfousing thesubprocessmodule. All executions use argument lists rather than raw shell strings, which prevents shell injection vulnerabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from KiCad design files and project documentation. Ingestion points:
view.pyreads schematic and board files, as well asDESIGN.md. Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters are used when passing parsed data back to the agent. Capability inventory: The script performs file system operations (reads) and executes localized CLI tools; it lacks network access. Sanitization: External data is filtered through regular expressions and cast to numeric types before being used in tool arguments or logic. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
view.pyscript includes logic to dynamically add a sibling directory to the Python path to import a schematic helper library. This is a common practice for modular skills in a shared repository and is considered benign.
Audit Metadata