define-query-migration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes patterns for a query API that processes untrusted client-supplied arguments (
args). This introduces an attack surface where malicious input could attempt to bypass data access controls if validation logic is insufficient.\n - Ingestion points: The
defineQueryAPI accepts anargsobject derived from external client requests as shown in the migration examples inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions emphasize a safety-first approach by requiring Zod schema definitions for all query arguments and mandating that all queries originate from "allowed" factory functions that apply permission filters.\n
- Capability inventory: The code templates are restricted to database querying via the
zqlbuilder; no shell execution, arbitrary network calls, or dangerous dynamic code generation patterns are included.\n - Sanitization: Input is strictly validated using Zod, and authorization is enforced via context-dependent (
ctx) permission helpers that filter results at the database level.
Audit Metadata