golang-continuous-integration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The AI code review workflow defined in
assets/claude-code-review.ymlandassets/copilot-review-instructions.mdis designed to ingest and process untrusted data from pull request diffs, metadata, and user comments. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
gh pr diff,gh pr view, andgh pr listcommands in theclaude-code-review.ymljobs. - Boundary markers: The prompts do not use specific XML tags or robust delimiters to wrap the output of the
ghcommands, which could allow malicious content in a PR to influence the agent's behavior. - Capability inventory: The workflow grants the agent capabilities to post inline comments, create PR-level comments, and read workflow logs across multiple parallel jobs.
- Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or filtering of the PR diff content before it is processed by the AI agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on several external utilities and scripts to perform its automation tasks.
- Package installation: The skill metadata and review workflows install the
skillspackage via NPM and requiregoreleaserandghvia Homebrew. - Remote script execution: The
claude-code-review.ymlworkflow downloads additional Go-specific agent skills fromhttps://github.com/samber/cc-skills-golangusingnpx skills addat runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell commands to manage the development environment and CI pipelines.
- The agent is explicitly allowed to use
Bash(go:*),Bash(git:*),Bash(goreleaser:*), andBash(gh:*)as defined in theallowed-toolsfrontmatter. - The
dependabot-auto-merge.ymlasset executesgh pr mergeto modify the repository state, though it is protected by agithub.actorguard.
Audit Metadata