schema-fixture

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates the target spec input directly into a shell command in SKILL.md: npx jest --testPathPattern="engine\\.<spec>". This creates a command injection vulnerability where a user can provide crafted input containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&, or |) to execute arbitrary commands on the host system.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates arbitrary code execution by taking a user-provided Zod snippet and writing it into a .spec.ts file, which is then executed by the test runner. A crafted snippet can escape the expected Zod construction to execute arbitrary system commands during the verification step (Step 4).\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an unsafe data processing surface for indirect injection.\n
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the Case name, Zod snippet, and Expected inputs defined in SKILL.md.\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters provided to ensure the agent treats the user-provided snippets as non-executable data or to escape potential payload content.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local filesystem (SKILL.md Step 3) and execute shell commands (SKILL.md Step 4).\n
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not specify any validation or filtering for the user-provided snippets or parameters before they are used in filesystem and shell operations.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 17, 2026, 11:50 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — schema-fixture